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Abstract. One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex 
structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the 
theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful 
to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and 
distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation 
of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article 
I aim at answering the suggestion of several thinkers to redefine emergence and 
downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, 
I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications 
of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in 
terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, 
and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue.
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Abbreviations
Abbreviations for the works of Aristotle
De an. De anima (On the Soul)
Gen. et corr. De generatione et corruptione (On Generation and Corruption)
De part. De partibus animalium (On the Parts of Animals)
Meta. Metaphysica (The Metaphysics)
Phys. Physica (The Physics)
Emergence and Downward Causation...
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Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
De prin. nat. De principiis naturae
In De an. In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium
In Meta. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria
In Phys. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Sent. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum
Q. de an. Questio disputata de anima
Q. de pot. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia
SCG Summa contra gentiles
ST Summa theologiae
[W]e do not think that we know anything unless we grasp the “why” which is to 
grasp the cause. […] For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the 
cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in man.
Thomas Aquinas, In Phys. II, lect. 5 (§ 176); ST, I, 12, 1, co.
Introduction
Commenting on the first words of the Book of Genesis—stating that In the 
beginning, God created the heavens and the earth—Michael Dodds (2012, 1) 
notes that these words tell us two fundamental truths about God: God is, 
and God acts. But if we believe in a God who acts—he continues—we can 
talk about God’s action only in terms of a broader language of causality. 
One might think the problem of causation belongs predominantly to 
natural sciences, which are concerned with changes occurring in nature, 
and with relations/interactions between entities, systems, and organisms. 
But the truth is that causal reflection has its roots in philosophy of nature, 
which also originated the natural sciences as we know them today. Moreo-
ver, it turns out that the most robust theory of causation in the history of 
human thought, which inspired Aquinas’ classical view on divine action, 
was developed in the context of the natural philosophy of Aristotle and 
his medieval commentators. Although questioned and rejected in modern 
and early contemporary scientific and philosophical explanation, the 
Aristotelian fourfold notion of causation has its revival in the context of 
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particular philosophical questions raised by natural sciences of today. One 
of them refers to systems biology and the theory of emergence (EM) and 
downward causation (DC).
The aim of this article is to show how the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory 
of causation and divine action can be applied to the philosophical and 
theological reflection inspired by the biology of complex (irreducible) 
structures and by dynamic phenomena in nature. The first section begins 
with some remarks on the nonreductionist approach in contemporary 
science and philosophy of science. It also offers a short evaluation of the 
ontological aspects of the theory of EM and DC, which became popular 
among scientists and philosophers of science reflecting on the phenome-
non of biological complexity.
The second section concentrates on an analysis of EM and DC in terms 
of the Aristotelian fourfold notion of causation. It will show that such 
redefinition of emergentism requires a rejection of causal monism, which 
is still predominant in scientific circles. Moreover, it will also prove that 
any attempt to describe thoroughly the reality of the world has to take into 
account not only the explanation offered by natural sciences (referring to 
quantitative aspects of reality), but also the description offered in philos-
ophy of nature and metaphysics (preoccupied with qualitative aspects of 
nature).
The third section treats about Aquinas’ theology of divine action, 
with reference to his understanding of the nature of divine action and 
his analysis of God’s agency in relation to the division of the four causes. 
Finally, in the last section, the dialog between natural science and philos-
ophy—introduced in section two—will be further developed to embrace 
theological implications of EM and DC, analyzed in terms of Aquinas’ view 
on divine action.
1. Anti-reductionist Turn in Philosophy of Science
Even if still predominant in various scientific circles, causal reduction-
ism of the modern era has been seriously challenged with the advance 
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of contemporary science, and the origin of the discipline of philosophy 
of science. Our meta-reflection on the nature of scientific progress and 
some important philosophical aspects of the new scientific discoveries, 
theories, and hypotheses, helped us realize that the monolithic, cleansed, 
and tidy reductionist picture—that attracted many scholars and thinkers 
in the past—does not stand and cannot give a proper account of the actual 
complexity of nature.
This can be seen in particular in the field of biology. The rapid devel-
opment of biochemistry and molecular biology in the last century had 
led many scientists to believe that their reductionist approach—reducing 
biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics, and limiting all types of 
causation inherited from ancient and medieval science and philosophy to 
efficient (physical) causation—would prove to be the only viable and truly 
scientific method of biological research. Contrary to their expectations, our 
ability to enter the molecular level of organisms and biochemical processes 
has opened us to the incredible complexity of the structures, processes and 
patterns of living organisms, and thus challenged the reductionist paradigm. 
The intrinsic interrelatedness of different components of natural processes, 
such as metabolic or cell signaling networks, and their influence on the 
behavior of organisms, have led many bio-scientists not only to distinguish 
between various levels of organization of matter in biology, but also to 
propose a more holistic approach and methodology in biological sciences.
This approach inspired, in turn, a recent revival of the theory of EM, 
which speaks about the novelty of processes, entities, and properties at 
higher levels of complexity of matter. It not only strives to develop an 
ontology of these levels of complexity and characterize the laws of nature 
which are proper for them, but also speaks about nondeducibility, non-
predictability, and irreducibility of emergents. Most importantly, trying to 
defend the novelty of emergent properties and phenomena in ontological 
terms, the followers of emergentism introduce the category of DC, i.e. 
a new type of causal power characteristic of complex systems, influencing 
in a top-down manner their basal constituents, and irreducible to the 
causal operations proper for the lower levels of complexity.
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The theory of EM and DC has become over the last few decades probably 
the most popular conceptual tool in scientific and philosophical attempts 
at explaining the nature and character of global organization observed in 
various phenomena such as magnetization, laser light, crystallization, neu-
ral networks, living organisms, collective behavior, or ecological systems. 
However, closer analysis of emergentism shows a number of philosophical 
problems that it faces. Probably the most challenging among them refers to 
the concept of DC and the ambiguity among emergentists in their attempt 
to specify its nature more precisely. Those who want to remain faithful to 
the methodology of natural science tend to define DC in terms of physical 
interactions (efficient causes), which questions its irreducibility. Those 
who emphasize its novelty and distinctiveness from physical causes find 
it difficult to identify its ultimate character. They also come at risk of 
violating the rules of physicalism and causal closure, which they want to 
follow as scientists and/or philosophers of science.1
Realizing the difficulty of this dilemma a group of researchers led by 
Claus Emmeche suggested that in order to make sense of the theory of EM 
and keep the notion of DC plausible, we need to expand our understanding 
of causality in nature:
[Downward Causation] does not involve the idea of a strict ‘efficient’ temporal 
causality from an independent higher level to a lower one, rather, the entities 
at various levels may enter part-whole relations (e.g., mental phenomena con-
trol their component neural and biophysical sub-elements), in which the con-
trol of the part by the whole can be seen as a kind of functional (teleological) 
causation, which is based on efficient, material as well as formal causation in 
a multinested system of constraints (Emmeche, et al. 2000, 25).
Similar is the position of Michael Silberstein who claims that:
Systemic causation means admitting types of causation that goes beyond effi-
cient causation to include causation as global constraints, teleological causation 
akin to Aristotle’s final and formal causes, and the like (Silberstein 2006, 218).
1 See Kim (1999), 31–33; and Tabaczek (2013), 386–94.
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Following the same way of reasoning A. Moreno and J. Umerez argue 
for the acceptance of a new type of causation in biological systems, which 
“is ‘formal’ in a sense that it infuses forms, i.e., it materially restructures 
matter according to a form” (Moreno and Umerez 2000, 46).
What we find in these suggestions is an intriguing attempt to retrieve 
the Aristotelian fourfold division into material, formal, efficient, and final 
causality. Unfortunately none of the authors mentioned here offers an 
in-depth analysis of the four causes and their application to EM and DC. 
I would like to offer such an analysis in what follows. I will build it on both 
the original Aristotelian reflection on causality, and Aquinas’ interpreta-
tion and development of the Philosopher’s thought.
2. EM and DC Reconsidered
2.1. Ontology of Emergents
If EM is real, it tells us something important about complex dynamic 
processes such as laser light, crystallization, or the formation of an eddy 
in a stream, and dynamic systems/wholes such as living organisms. It is 
commonly thought that it points toward irreducible features, decisive for 
their nature and operation (DC). But the whole enterprise of emergentism, 
analyzed from a philosophical point of view, begs the question of the onto-
logical status of emergents. Trying to answer this question Achim Stephan 
states:
In the literature on emergence various types of things have been characterized 
as emergent: laws, effects, events, entities, and properties. However, we should 
easily agree to explicate the so-called emergent entities and events in terms of 
emergent properties: An entity is said to be emergent iff it has emergent prop-
erties. An event is said to be emergent iff it is an instantiation of an emergent 
property. Emergent effects, as mentioned by Lewes, have to be interpreted as 
emergent entities (substances) or properties. Thus, what remains are laws and 
properties. A law may be called emergent iff it contains emergent properties. 
Laws may do their work either in the context of transition theories explaining 
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changes or in the context of property theories explaining the instantiation of 
properties by complex systems (Stephan 1992, 27).2
The suggestion of Stephan to classify emergents as properties—typical 
for the analytic metaphysics of particulars which defines them in terms of 
substratum or bundle theories (see Loux 2006, 84–92)—raises some serious 
ontological doubts. For metaphysically speaking, properties are always 
“attached” to something. They are properties of concrete entities, and 
cannot float freely in nature. Therefore, I find Stephan’s suggestion, that 
the nature of emergents be defined in terms of properties, troublesome 
and questionable. When we hear him saying that “an entity is said to be 
emergent iff it has emergent properties,” we need to ask about the onto-
logical priority and the metaphysical character of the entity or a group of 
entities in question. To give an example, is water emergent because it has 
the properties of liquidity, wetness, viscosity, etc.? Or rather, does it have 
these properties because it is emergent? This would mean that the very 
nature of the conglomeration of H2O molecules is ontologically different, 
which makes it exhibit new characteristics that none of H2O molecules has 
when taken separately. If the latter is true, then the emergent character 
of entities is not reducible to emergent properties characteristic of them.
Similar are the challenges concerning the idea of the redefinition of the 
emergent character of events in terms of emergent properties. First of all, 
we must realize the fallacy of the tendency to regard events—in a purely 
Humean spirit—as causal in their nature. Assigning to events the quality 
of causation does not give them an independent ontological status. Their 
occurrence needs to engage concrete entities and becomes a function of 
cause-effect relations between them. Consequently, Stephan’s claim that 
“[a]n event is said to be emergent iff it is an instantiation of an emergent 
property,” raises again a metaphysical query concerning the ontological 
ground of the property in question. It must be a property of something, 
2 Defining emergents in terms of properties and qualities is probably the most popular 
position among emergentists, which goes back to the British emergentism (e.g. Samuel 
Alexander 1920 and Charlie D. Broad 1925).
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and its emergent character requires an ontological base. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, it is not an event that instantiates an emergent property, but 
rather it is concrete entities that are constitutive for this event, providing 
an ontological ground for emergents.
Stephan’s attempt to describe new emergent laws in terms of emergent 
properties seems to be even more confusing. In his claim that “[a] law may 
be called emergent iff it contains emergent properties,” he may be at risk 
of attributing to the laws of nature an ontological character. Such is at least 
the flavor of his idea of the containment of emergent properties in a law. 
As we have said, properties must be mediated by concrete beings (sub-
stances in Aristotelian language). They do not have an ontological status 
on their own. To describe the relation between properties and substances 
one can use the category of containment, but to suggest a containment of 
emergent properties in laws of nature, implicitly assigns an ontological 
status to the latter which is philosophically dubious. However, one might 
try to defend the position of Stephan against this charge. Continuing 
his reflection, he states: “Laws may do their work either in the context 
of transition theories explaining changes or in the context of property 
theories explaining the instantiation of properties by complex systems.” 
On the base of this assertion we may assume Stephan assigns to laws of 
nature a descriptive rather than a prescriptive character, and locates the 
ontological basis of emergent properties in complex systems. If this is 
the case, however, his own rule of reducing all candidates for emergents 
to properties is endangered, as complex systems seem to have emergent 
qualities prior to the properties that originate from them.
2.2. Emergentism and Hylomorphism
The criticism of Stephan’s position makes even more plausible the sug-
gestion of Emmeche et al., Silberstein, and Moreno and Umerez, to rethink 
the nature and ontology of emergents in terms of formal causation in the 
Aristotelian sense. But we must be aware that taking this route requires not 
only leaving behind causal reductionism and monism—which has dominat-
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ed natural sciences since modernity—but also requires regarding philoso-
phy of nature and ontology as valid and indispensable tools, accompanying 
natural sciences in their attempts of a thorough description of reality. 
I think this fact is not emphasized enough by the authors mentioned here. 
We cannot ignore the fact that reintroducing Aristotelian formal causes 
is impossible without bringing back his whole theory of hylomorphism, 
which is defined in terms of philosophical categories that go beyond the 
methodology of natural science. Thus, in order to redefine EM in terms of 
formal causation, we need to understand, first, the core of the hylomorphic 
argument as it was defined by Aristotle and clarified by Aquinas.
Criticizing Plato for his emphasis on the transcendent character of 
form, which results not only in a certain kind of dualism and devaluation 
of material reality, but also in a difficulty of his philosophy in explaining 
change and stability (becoming requires participating in various forms), 
Aristotle proposes a doctrine of matter and form understood as two causes 
closely related to each other. He thus defines them respectively in The 
Physics and The Metaphysics:
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, 
is called ‘cause’, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the 
genera of which the bronze and the silver are species. In another sense (2) the 
form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are 
called ‘causes’ (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), 
and the parts in the definition (Phys. II, 3 [194b 24–28]).
‘Cause’ means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into 
being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, 
and so are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the 
definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 
and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included in the 
definition (Meta. V, 2 [1013a 24–29]).
What is crucial regarding the material cause is its not being reducible to 
basic chunks of stuff which build entities. Although we have difficulty 
grasping it in the oft cited quotations from The Physics and The Metaphys-
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ics—in which matter seems to be defined as some empirically perceptible 
stuff (bronze or silver)—for Aristotle matter is a principle of potentiality 
that persists through all changes that a given substance can be exposed to, 
something that constitutes the very possibility of being a substance at all. 
This becomes clear in the following passages from The Physics:
The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy. For 
as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the form-
less before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying 
nature to substance, i.e. the ‘this’ or existent (Phys. I, 7 [191a 8–12]).
The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does 
not. As that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for 
what ceases to be – the privation – is contained within it. But as potentiality it 
does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of 
becoming and ceasing to be. […] For my definition of matter is just this – the 
primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualifi-
cation, and which persists in the result (Phys. I, 9 [192a 25–33]).3
The key point of the first passage is Aristotle’s reference to analogy, which 
tells us that the underlying nature is not quite the same as perceptible 
matter. Note also that in the second definition Aristotle does not use the 
term πρώτη ὔλη (primary matter), which is usually associated with his 
understanding of material cause, but rather τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον which 
translates as “primary substratum.”
Concerning formal cause, Aristotle stands in a radical opposition to the 
transcendental character of Ideas in Plato. For Aristotle, forms must be in 
things, determining their actuality. This becomes clear from the quotations 
from The Physics and The Metaphysics cited above. In both passages Aris-
totle, speaking of formal causality, uses the term “ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι,” 
which Gaye translates as “the statement of the essence,” and Ross as “the 
3 “By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quanti-
ty nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined” (Meta. VII, 3 
[1029a 20-21]). “And if there is a first thing, which is no longer, in reference to something 
else, called ‘thaten’, this is prime matter” (Meta. IX, 7 [1049a 24]).
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definition of the essence.”4 However, Aristotle uses also two other terms: 
μορφή and εἴδος which translate as “shape” or “appearance.” These may 
bring confusion and reduction of form to geometrical shape, which flattens 
out Aristotle’s original idea.5
Aristotle introduces an important distinction between substantial and 
accidental form, which is best explained in his example of the two types 
of changes in nature. In De generatione et corruptione, he first mentions 
“alteration” (an accidental change), which occurs when a thing or being 
changes in its properties while remaining the same substance: “The body, 
e.g., although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and now ill; and 
the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular, and yet remains 
the same bronze.” He then contrasts it with a situation, “when nothing 
perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes 
as a whole.” He calls the latter “a coming-to-be of one substance and 
a passing-away of the other,” e.g. a wooden plank burned into ashes.6
When he speaks of material cause, Aquinas emphasizes its character as 
the principle of potentiality. His explanation is very precise and helps us 
avoid reducing matter to some basic building blocks. Referring to Aristot-
le’s example of “bronze of the statue,” Aquinas states:
[…] although it is the matter with respect to the statue, the bronze itself is 
composed of matter and form. Therefore bronze is not called prime matter, 
4 Phys. II, 3 (194b 26); Meta. V, 2 (1013a 27).
5 See, for instance, Scott (2007), 6. In the second book of The Physics, Aristotle explains 
briefly that the formal cause answers the question “why” something is the kind of thing 
it is, but without involving any motion (Phys. II, 7 [198a 17–18]). In Metaphysics I, 3, he 
refers indirectly to the formal cause defining it as the essence, the ultimate “why,” and 
the ultimate principle: “[C]auses are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean 
the substance, i.e. the essence (for the ‘why’ is reducible finally to the definition, and the 
ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and principle) […]” (Meta. I, 3 [983a 26–29]). See also Meta. VII, 
17 (1041b 11–32).
Aristotle uses one more term: ἐντελέχεια, which relates formal to final causation and 
denotes form as actualized in the final state of a being. “It is form (μορφἡ), therefore, 
which is nature (φύσις). It is form as ἐντελέχεια which is the τέλος of γένεσις, that is, of the 
coming-to-be of φύσις. In its state of completion, φύσις is synonymous with ἐντελέχεια, the 
fulfillment of εἶδοϛ” (O’Rourke 2004, 17).
6 See Gen. et cor., I, 4 (319b 10–18).
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even though it has matter. However, that matter which is understood without 
any form and privation, but rather is subject to form and privation, is called 
prime matter by reason of the fact that there is no other matter before it (De 
prin. nat. 14).7
Aquinas notices that primary matter, as a principle of potentiality, is char-
acterized by a certain kind of privation, which “causes” it to seek form. 
But he is careful to add that primary matter must not be identified with 
privation itself, and for two reasons.
First, matter is non-being accidentally, whereas privation is non-being per se. 
(...) Secondly, matter is ‘near to the thing’ and exists in some respect, because 
it is in potency to the thing and is in some respect the substance of the thing, 
since it enters into the constitution of the substance. But this cannot be said 
of privation (In Phys. I, lect. 15 [§ 132]).8
This assertion helps us acknowledge another feature of primary matter, 
namely, that it cannot be defined or known by itself, but only as being 
informed, since all that we know of it, we know through its form.9 For this 
reason, matter together with form can be regarded as “mutual causes of 
being,” matter as a cause of form, inasmuch as it supports it in being, form 
as a cause of matter, inasmuch as it gives it its actual being.10 From this 
we can infer that form is not added to matter from the outside. Quite the 
contrary, all forms are present in primary matter as a possibility, and are 
educed from its potentiality. This assertion in turn inspires Aquinas to sug-
7 See also Wippel (2000), 312-20.
8 See also In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 763). In De prin. nat. Aquinas emphasizes that privation is not 
an active principle: “It is clear, therefore, according to the opinion of Aristotle that priva-
tion, which is posited as a per accidens principle of nature, is not a capacity for a form, nor 
an inchoate form, nor some imperfect active principle, as some say. Rather it is the very 
absence of form, or the contrary of form, which occurs in the subject” (De. prin. nat. 113). 
Wippel (2007, 240-71) offers a good introduction to Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics.
9 See De prin. nat. 14 and ST I, 66, 1, ad 3. Commenting on Physics, Aquinas sides with Aris-
totle who claims that we know primary matter only by analogy.
10 See In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 775); Meta. VIII, 6 (1045b 18-21).
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gest that matter must be properly disposed to receive a particular form.11
Aquinas characterizes formal cause as that which makes a thing to be 
what it is. He says that form “causes the quiddity of the thing.”12 In other 
words, “the form of a thing is […] the intelligible expression of its quiddity, 
i.e., the formula by which its quiddity is known.” That is why “it is from 
a thing’s form that the principal part of the definition comes.”13 On another 
occasion, Aquinas repeats one more time that it is form “by which a ‘par-
ticular thing’ actually exists.”14 He also distinguishes between substantial 
form, which gives being to matter in an absolute way, and accidental form, 
which does so merely “in a qualified sense.”15 But it appears to me that the 
most important contribution to Aristotle’s teaching on formal causality 
made by Aquinas is his list of four types of formal causation as defined in 
his Commentary on Metaphysics:
1. In Aristotle’s examples of the goblet made of silver or statue made 
of bronze, the form is used in a general and somehow unqualified 
sense.16
2. But sometimes many things are brought together to constitute one 
thing. This can happen in three ways, which are associated with 
three respective kinds of formal causation:
11 See Q. de pot. 3, 4, ad 7; 5, 1, co.; Q. de an. 9, co. In SCG Aquinas further develops this idea 
saying about an inclination of matter to be gradually informed by more perfect forms: 
“Thus, prime matter is in potency, first of all, to the form of an element. When it is exist-
ing under the form of an element it is in potency to the form of a mixed body; that is why 
the elements are matter for the mixed body. Considered under the form of a mixed body, 
it is in potency to a vegetative soul, for this sort of soul is the act of a body. In turn, the 
vegetative soul is in potency to a sensitive soul, and a sensitive one to an intellectual one. 
(...) So, elements exist for the sake of mixed bodies; these latter exist for the sake of living 
bodies, among which plants exist for animals, and animals for men. Therefore, man is the 
end of the whole order of generation” (SCG III, 22, 7).
12 In Phys. II, lect. 5 (§ 183); See also In III Sent., d. 27, 1, 1.
13 In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 764).
14 In De an. 2, lect. 1 (§ 215). “[T]he form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by 
which something is” (ST I, 110, 2, co.).
15 In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 774).
16 That is why some thinkers tend to interpret Aristotle’s notion of form merely as a geomet-
rical shape. Aquinas says that here form may be called species: “[T]he form corresponding 
to such a matter can be called the species” (In Meta. V, lect. 3 [§ 779]). It seems that the 
category of species has a general and unqualified meaning for him at this point.
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c) things can be united merely by their arrangement (secundum ordinem), 
as men in the army or houses in a city;
d) things can be united by contact and bond (secundum contactum et col-
ligationem), which is evident in the example of a house and its parts;
e) and sometimes an alteration of the component parts (alteration com-
ponentium) is added to above (b), which occurs in the case of a com-
pound (mixtione).17
This classification helps to distinguish with a great precision the idea of 
form understood merely as a geometrical shape or aggregation of building 
blocks (an accidental form) from the concept of form defined as the source 
of the quiddity of a thing (a substantial form), which brings alteration to 
parts united in a whole.18
The whole analysis presented here has a crucial meaning for the recon-
sideration of the theory of EM in terms of a broader notion of causation. 
The acceptance of Aristotle’s hylomorphism enables us to solve the ambi-
guity of defining emergents in terms of properties. It suggests character-
izing them in reference to new substantial forms of more complex/higher 
entities/organisms and new accidental forms of more complex dynamic 
processes engaging particular entities (e.g. molecules of H2O in an eddy). 
The novelty of properties characteristic to emergent entities or processes 
finds its ground in the novelty of substantial and accidental forms proper 
for them. Thus, we can say that emergent properties describe and reveal 
the emergent character of higher entities or processes, rather than being 
decisive about their emergent nature. Moreover, the emergent character 
of higher entities and processes thus understood is of an irreducible type, 
as it is defined in terms of qualitative changes, which are not simple con-
sequences or summations of quantitative changes (described in natural 
sciences and amenable to mathematical analysis).
Finally, the reference to hylomorphism points toward another two 
types of causation which are crucial for Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy 
17 In Meta. V, lect. 3 (§ 779).
18 For more information on Aquinas’ teaching on substantial forms, including human soul, 
see Wippel (2000), 327–51; Miller (1995), 69–79.
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of nature, and prove to be helpful in our redefinition of EM and DC. I will 
analyze them in what follows.
2.3. Emergentism and Efficient Causation
Among properties characteristic of emergent entities/organisms and 
processes we find those that express their abilities of activity and reac-
tivity, which are usually described in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy 
in terms of efficient causation. Thus, we can say that the new substantial 
forms of emergent entities/organisms and processes are decisive about 
the nature of their efficacy. This observation becomes crucial for the un-
derstanding of the nature of DC. As such, it should always be considered 
in reference to the substantial form of an emergent entity, which decides 
about its behavior (activity and reactivity). Hence, although the new type 
of activity proper to such an entity, and classified as an example of DC, 
can be described in terms of efficient causality, it is possible only with two 
important qualifications. First, efficient cause analyzed philosophically in 
reference to the Aristotelian fourfold notion of causation does not stand on 
its own, without a reference to the substantial form and accidental features 
of an entity that shows it. This fact relates DC necessarily to hylomorphic 
analysis of emergent entities and processes, even if it is otherwise a subject 
of scientific analysis and mathematical description. Second, we have to 
remember that within the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of causation, 
efficient causality has broader meaning than the one defined within the 
domain of the natural sciences. In his basic definition of efficient causation 
Aristotle goes beyond physical efficacy and extends it to mental activity:
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave 
advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what 
is made and what causes change of what is changed (Phys. II, 3 [194b 29–31]).19
Interestingly, it is precisely causal activity of the mind that became one of 
the most common examples of DC in contemporary emergentism, which 
19 See also Meta. V, 2 (1013a 29–32).
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pays attention to causes that originate changes in the behavior of emergent 
wholes, but are hardly measurable quantitatively and hardly describable in 
the mathematical language of natural sciences.
In his Commentary to Metaphysics, Aquinas follows Aristotle and pre-
sents an extended understanding of efficient causation. Referring to the 
typology proposed by Avicenna he speaks about:
a) perfective (perficiens) efficient cause – which gives the final perfec-
tion to a thing;
b) dispositive (disponens) efficient cause – which prepares matter to 
receive form, e.g., one who organizes materials to build a house;
c) auxiliary (adiuvans) efficient cause – which acts for an end which 
is not its own, e.g., someone who assists a king in a war (a special 
example here is secondary cause acting for the end of the primary 
cause, which will be discussed below);
d) advisory (consilians) efficient cause – which specifies the end and 
form of the activity, the way in which the first agent, acting by in-
tellect, is related to every secondary agent, natural or intellectual, 
e.g., the naval architect instructing the shipwright.20
The fourth category of efficient causation listed by Aquinas is unique. 
It not only goes beyond physical efficacy—which makes it important for our 
understanding of DC—but also introduces the distinction between primary 
(first) and secondary causation. This distinction, together with Aquinas’s 
acknowledgement of the difference between principal and instrumental 
causes, proves to be crucial for his theology of divine action. I will come 
back to it later. In the meantime we have to refer to the fourth type of 
causation on Aristotle’s list and its importance for the theory of EM.
2.4. Emergentism and Teleology
In order to complete his explanation of the fact that things are what they 
are, and can change or even cease to exist, Aristotle introduces one more 
type of causation, which he defines as follows:
20 See In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ &66).
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Again (4) in the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done, 
e.g. health is the cause of walking about. (‘Why is he walking about?’ we say. 
‘To be healthy’, and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) 
The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about 
through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction 
of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All 
these things are ‘for the sake of’ the end, though they differ from one another 
in that some are activities, others instruments (Phys. II, 3 [194b 32 – 195a 2).21
Following Aristotle, Aquinas defines the last—final cause—as “that for the 
sake of which” something is done or comes to be, i.e. a good proper to a be-
ing which can be attained.22 He also follows Aristotle when he emphasizes 
that final causality is present not only in conscious human decisions, but 
also in the natural world, where it should not be reduced to a mysterious, 
quasi-efficient causation, directing things according to a pre-established 
harmony, acting at the present from the future. It is a distinct type of 
causation, a natural tendency of things to actualize their potencies, i.e. to 
realize what is proper to their nature: “it is possible for the natural agent to 
intend the end without deliberation; and to intend this is nothing else than 
to have a natural inclination to something.”23 Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s 
21 See also Meta. V, 2 (1013a 33 – 1013b 2); Wallace (1997), 52–70.
22 “[T]hat for the sake of which something else comes to be is the greatest good ‘and the 
end’ of other things, i.e., it is naturally disposed to their end” (In Meta. V, lect. 3 [§ 781]). 
See also Meta. V, 2 (1013b 26–27); In Phys. V, lect. 5 (§ 181, 186); De prin. nat. 18; and In 
Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 771) where Aquinas follows Aristotle claiming that things intermediate 
between the first and the ultimate end are also ends with respect to things preceding 
them. Elders (1993, 301) notes that “Aristotle distinguishes between an end for the sake 
of which (the so-called finis cuius gratia) and the end which is someone’s benefit (finis 
cui).” See Meta. XII, 7 (1072b 1–3); De an. II, 4 (415b 2–3). Aristotle makes a connection 
between teleology and goodness in Meta. XII, 10 (1075a 12–22). Aquinas follows his idea 
in In Meta. I, lect. 4 (§ 70).
23 De prin. nat. 19. “[w]e should notice that, although every agent, both natural and volun-
tary, intends an end, still it does not follow that every agent knows the end or deliberates 
about the end. To know the end is necessary in those whose actions are not determined, 
but which may act for opposed ends as, for example, voluntary agents. Therefore it is 
necessary that these know the end by which they determine their actions. But in natural 
agents the actions are determined, hence it is not necessary to choose those things which 
are for the end” (ibid.). “It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do 
not observe the agent deliberating” (Phys. II, 8 [199b 26–27]). See also SCG III, 2; Elders 
(1993), 304–305.
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observation that “in the works of nature the good end and the final cause 
is still more dominant than in works of art.”24
The notion of teleology becomes important for the characteristics of 
EM and DC. Terrence Deacon (2012; and 2014 with Koutroufinis)—who 
describes EM in terms of new features as functions of constraints, char-
acteristic for dynamical processes, rather than in terms of DC (“increased 
constraints” versus “closure-denying” emergentism)—emphasizes the 
importance of intrinsic teleology at the higher levels of organization of 
matter. He sees it as a crucial factor distinguishing living from nonliv-
ing dynamical systems, enabling us to attribute to the former a quality 
of a primitive “self.” But even in reference to the classical version of the 
theory of EM, we can analyze DC in terms of the new types of teleology, 
i.e. tendencies to realize new potencies characteristic of a given emergent 
entity/organism or dynamic process.
2.5. The True Nature of DC
Such analysis of teleology, together with the reflection on the formal and 
efficient causation proper for emergents, shows the interrelatedness of 
various types of causality which fall under the general term of DC in con-
temporary philosophical reflection on biological complexity. Armed with 
the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of nature and metaphysics we were 
able to specify the exact character of this new type of causation, without 
falling into reductionism. For unlike physically/mechanically interpreted 
24 De part. I, 1 (639b 20–23). Aristotle understands works of art as conscious and planned 
human activities that aim at achieving an end. He gives an example of a builder and a phy-
sician. The category of good applied to nature does not have a moral character and is not 
referred merely to conscious beings. See SCG III, 3. See also Aristotle’s emphasis on the 
presence of final causality in nature in Physics, II, 8 (199b 15–18). This broad understand-
ing of teleology goes unnoticed by some contemporary thinkers. Emmeche et al. (2000, 
17) seem to think of final cause only in terms of a natural, that is, unconscious, inclination 
toward maintaining the stability of ‘an integrated processual whole’. That is why instead 
of the final cause they refer to a ‘functional cause.’ Alwyn Scott (2007, 6), on the other 
hand, sees final causality mainly as a desire of an intentional organism. He does not pay 
enough attention to the final causality inherent to all nature. Thus he struggles with the 
problem of “purposive answers” in biological sciences.
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efficient causation characteristic of higher levels of complexity, which is 
reducible to lower level interactions, and amenable to mathematical and 
quantitative description, formal and final types of causation—proper for 
a given order of complexity and qualitative in nature—are always irre-
ducible. One cannot, for instance, reduce the form and teleology proper 
for a living organism to the form and teleology of elementary particles 
building it. I claim that this redefinition of DC in terms of formal, final, 
and efficient causality distinctive for emergent entities/processes, both 
saves its irreducibility and explains its meaning, answering the criticism 
of those who challenged its spooky and undefined character in writings of 
many proponents of emergentism.
Interestingly, interrelatedness of various types of causation, proper for 
given entities and/or causal occurences, and falling under the contempo-
rary category of DC, was noticed by both Aristotle and Aquinas. We have 
seen them already relating primary mater to substantial form. Moreover, 
while analyzing efficient and final causality, Aquinas notes they are related 
as well. The efficient cause is the cause of the final as it begins motion 
towards it, while the final cause is the cause of the efficient as it is the 
reason for its activity.25 Going still further, Aquinas points toward the 
relation between formal and final causes saying: “the form and the end 
coincide in the same thing,” and “it must belong to the natural philosophy 
to consider the form not only insofar as it is form but also insofar as it is the 
end.”26 In fact, on numerous occasions we can find him saying, following 
Aristotle, about the relations between three causes: “Notice, also, that 
three causes can coincide in one thing, namely, the form, the end and the 
efficient cause.”27 At the same time, however, siding again with Aristotle, 
Aquinas attributes the primacy among causes to the final cause saying: 
“even though the end is the last thing to come into being in some cases, it 
25 See In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 775); De prin. nat. 28.
26 In Phys. V, lect. 11 (§ 246).
27 De prin. nat. 34; In Phys. II, lect. 11 (§ 242). “The last three [the form, the mover, ‘that 
for the sake of which’] often coincide; for the ‘what’ and ‘that for the sake of which’ 
are one, while the primary source of motion is the same in species as these” (Phys. II, 7 
[198a 25–27]).
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is always prior in causality. Hence it is called the ‘cause of causes,’ because 
it is the cause of the causality of all causes.”28
Naturally, both Aristotle and Aquinas have much more to say on the 
topic of causal relationships in nature.29 I have selected and discussed only 
those aspects of their philosophy of causation which prove to be helpful 
in my attempt of a redefinition of EM and DC. I believe that the analysis 
presented here becomes, at least in part, a successful realization of the 
suggestion made by Emmeche et al., Silberstein, and Moreno and Umerez 
that was mentioned above.
But philosophical analysis of EM and DC in terms of the more robust, 
fourfold notion of causation, does not exhaust the explanatory potential 
of emergentism. Reconsidered in terms of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
philosophy of nature, the theory of EM and DC stimulates an intriguing 
inquiry into theological implications of emergentism. Since the main point 
of reference in such an inquiry is Aquinas’ understanding of the nature of 
divine action and his analysis of God’s agency in relation to all four types 
of causation, I will discuss these issues first.
3. Aquinas on Divine Action and Four Causes
3.1. The Nature of Divine Action
Because divine action must be a consequence of who God is, we need to 
begin with a short reflection concerning the character of the divine nature. 
28 In Meta. V, lect. 3 (§ 782). See also In Phys. II, lect. 5 (§ 186); De prin. nat. 29. “Plainly, 
however, that cause is the first which we call the final one. For this is the Reason, and the 
Reason forms the starting-point, alike in the works of art and in works of nature” (De part. 
I, 1 [639b 14–16]).
29 Other important topics related to philosophy of causation, and discussed by Aristotle and 
Aquinas, include: (1) the distinction between per se and per accidens causes; (2) the recip-
rocal character of causation; (3) the possibility of one and the same thing being a cause of 
contrarieties; (4) the difficulty in distinguishing and specifying all four causes in concrete 
causal situations; (5) simple and composite causes; (6) active and potential causes; (7) the 
principle of causation saying that what goes from potency to act requires a cause; (8) the 
principle of proportionate causation stating that effects must be proportionate to their 
causes and principles; (9) necessary and contingent (suppositional) character of causes; 
and (10) causality and chance (fortune). All of these issues are addressed and debated in 
the contemporary debate on causality. Their analysis goes beyond the scope of this article.
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Here, most fundamentally, we learn that—unlike created things: animate 
and inanimate—God is ipsum esse subsistens. For Aquinas, the material 
and formal causes described by Aristotle explain the essence (essentia) of 
every material being. In addition to essence (which explains what a thing 
is) each thing also requires a distinct principle to explain the fact that it 
is. Aquinas names this principle esse (the “act of being”). What is at stake 
here for Thomas is the fact that all creatures receive their esse from God 
and so are said to “participate” in being. God, on the contrary, is subsistent 
being itself (ipsum esse subsistens): his essence (essentia) is identical with 
his existence (esse). As Aquinas explains: “Subsisting being must be one. 
[…] Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are 
beings by participation.”30 Moreover, unlike creatures, God as ipsum esse 
subsistens does not have any potentiality. He is, therefore, a pure actuality 
that cannot change.31
This philosophical reflection on essence and existence becomes a point 
of departure for Aquinas’ theology of creation and divine action. Aquinas 
insists that on God’s part there is only one act, the act of God’s being 
(ipsum esse subsistens), though from our human perspective we rightly 
distinguish the act of creation (creatio ex nihilo) and the act by which the 
world, once created, is kept in existence (creatio continua). Thomas em-
30 ST I, 4, 2, co. “In Him essence does not differ from existence” (ST I, 3, 4, co.). “Since there-
fore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to 
Him” (ST I, 44, 1, co.) “God alone is actual being through His own essence, while other 
beings are actual beings through participation, since in God alone is actual being identical 
with His essence” (SCG III, 66, no. 7). See also ST I, 4, 3, ad 4; 104, 1, co.; In I Sent. 37, 1, 1, 
co.; Q. de ver. 5, 8, ad 9; SCG III, 65, no. 3; Super de causis, 24. On the meaning of ipsum esse 
subsistens see Te Velde (1995), 119–25.
31 Dodds (2012, 129–30) compares Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ understanding of potency and act 
to show that “To Aristotle, act (substantial form) is a determining principle. For Thomas, 
act (esse) is, in itself, an unlimited or boundless principle. In creatures, of course, neither 
substantial form nor esse exists apart from its corresponding principle of potency. Both 
Thomas and Aristotle recognize, however, that there is a being that is ‘pure act’ apart from 
all potency. The ‘pure act’ Aristotle attributes to this being, however, is the determinate 
perfection of pure substantial form. The ‘pure act’ Aquinas envisions is the boundless per-
fection of pure esse. For Thomas, as for Aristotle, pure act is the immovable summit of all 
perfection. In Aristotle, this is the immovable mover. For Aquinas, it is the God of revela-
tion.” See also Meta. XII, 6 (1071b 20); SCG I, 16; Q. de pot. 7, 2, ad 9; ST I, 3, 1, co.; 3, 4, co.
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phasizes the fact that the act of creatio ex nihilo is not a change in created 
being (a modification of being), but is rather the production of all created 
being. The act of creatio continua can be described as the sustaining of 
creatures in being.32 Aquinas attributes both aspects of creation to the 
providence of God, which he sees as including not only the eternal plan 
of God (“the reason of order,” ratio ordinis), but also the execution of that 
plan, which he calls “governance.”33 Moreover, because God is fully actual, 
we must acknowledge that his action is identical with his being: “God’s 
power is His essence. Therefore, His action is His being. But His being is 
His substance. Therefore, God’s action is His substance.”34 But if this is the 
case, it becomes clear that God as the ultimate source of esse cannot be 
treated as a univocal cause, acting along with the causality of creatures. 
32 “Creation is not change” (ST I, 45, 2, ad 2). “[T]he proper effect of God creating is what is 
presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being” (ST I, 45, 5, co.). “[C]reation 
in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being” 
(ST I, 45, 3, co.). “[B]eing is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other 
effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own 
power” (Q. de pot. 3, 7, co.). “[T]he being of every creature depends on God, so that not for 
a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by 
the operation of the Divine power” (ST I, 104, 1, co.). “God is the cause not indeed only of 
some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being” (ST I, 103, 5, co.). On the 
unity of creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua see Te Velde (2006), 125. On being as the 
proper effect of God, see Te Velde (1995), 176–83.
33 “Two things pertain to the care of providence—namely, the ‘reason of order,’ which is called 
providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of 
these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal” (ST I, 22, 1, ad 2). “[A] thing’s ulti-
mate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine 
goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to 
govern” (ST I, 103, 1, co.). “[T]hings are ordered to the ultimate end which God intends, 
that is, divine goodness, not only by the fact that they perform their operations, but also by 
the fact that they exist, since, to the extent that they exist, they bear the likeness of divine 
goodness which is the end for things […] Therefore, it pertains to divine providence that 
things are preserved in being” (SCG III, 65, no. 2). See also In I Sent. 39, 2, 1, co.; ST I, 22, 3, 
co.; 45, 5, co.; 104, 1, co.; SCG III, 77, no. 2.
34 SCG II, 9, no. 4. “Furthermore, an action that is not the substance of the agent is in the 
agent as an accident in its subject; and that is why action is reckoned as one of the nine 
categories of accident. But nothing can exist in God in the manner of an accident. There-
fore, God’s action is not other than His substance and His power.” (SCG II, 9, no. 5). See 
also ST I, 30, 2, ad 3.
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Because “nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus,”35 God 
cannot be classified with creatures in the same ontological category. On 
the contrary, although immanently present in his creation, in the very 
essence of his divine nature, God must be a transcendent agent, the “cause 
hidden from every man.”36
But the causality of God is not limited for Aquinas to the Creator’s 
enabling creatures to participate in his divine esse. God’s action is also 
manifested in all four modes of causation defined by Aristotle, which is the 
subject of my consideration in the following subsections.
3.2. Divine Action and Material Cause
Beginning with material cause, we must note that because primary matter 
is pure potentiality, it would be erroneous to assert that God (total actu-
ality) is the ultimate primary matter of each being.37 At the same time, 
however, it remains clear for Aquinas that primary matter comes from 
God and retains a likeness to him. Aquinas thus must acknowledge that 
“also primary matter is created by the universal cause of being.”38 Thomas 
repeatedly emphasizes that God’s action finds its expression in creating 
and providing primary matter as a source and principle of potentiality, and 
of all changes in nature. To this he also adds that because primary matter 
35 ST I, 25, 2 ad 2; see also In IX De div. nom. lect. 2 (§ 232–59). As an agent God is not con-
tained in any genus. Hence, creatures cannot participate in the likeness of God according 
to the same specific or generic formality, but only analogically. And because action fol-
lows being, God must differ from every other being, not only in esse but also in actio.
36 SCG III, 101, no. 1. On the perfection of God and God as creator, see Gilson (1956), 110–29. 
He also describes divine simplicity in (1963), 121-35. This conclusion of Aquinas touches 
on some other important issues, including the understanding of divine transcendence 
and immanence, and God’s relation to the world. Their analysis goes beyond the main 
object of our concern here.
37 “The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly [stultissime] taught that 
God was primary matter” (ST I, 3, 8, co.). See also In I Sent. 34, 1, 2, co.
38 ST I, 44, 2, co. “Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, 
yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine 
being” (ST I, 14, 11, ad 3). “Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of 
all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all 
things is one in reality” (ST I, 44, 4, ad 4).
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cannot exist without form, even in God the idea of primary matter is not 
distinct from the divine idea of the composite.39
3.3. Divine Action and Formal Cause
Because formal cause reduces primary matter from potentiality to act, we 
may appropriately refer to God as the ultimate source of formal causation. 
Hence, states Thomas, “Form is something divine and very good and desir-
able.” The reason we can say it is divine is because “every form is a certain 
participation in the likeness of the divine being, which is pure act. For 
each thing, insofar as it is in act, has form.”40 In other words, through their 
substantial form, creatures possess, in part, the actuality that is infinite in 
the Creator. Consequently, God can be said to act in the world as a source 
of all forms (forma formarum) and the source of all actuality.
At this point Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle’s philosophy and his theory 
of intrinsic formal causation, introducing the Platonic idea of external 
exemplar forms (causes), which he sees not as subsisting entities, but as 
ideas in the mind of God: “[I]n the divine mind there are exemplar forms 
of all creatures, which are called ideas, as there are forms of artifacts in 
the mind of an artisan.”41 Aquinas is careful to note that the plurality of 
divine exemplars is identical with the one divine essence inasmuch as that 
essence is known by God as imitable. For even if there can be no real mul-
tiplicity of ideas in the divine essence, there can be a logical multiplicity of 
them as objects of God’s understanding, which accounts for the diversity of 
creatures. They imitate God’s essence in different ways, as each living and 
nonliving entity has its own being (esse), distinct from that of every other 
entity. Moreover, this reasoning enables us to distinguish between the 
two types of divine exemplarism: the exemplarism of divine ideas—which 
involves a perfect likeness between a finite being and its representative 
divine idea; and the exemplarism of the divine nature—which involves the 
39 See In I Sent. 36, 2, 3, ad 2; Q. de ver. 3, 5; ST I, 7, 2, ad 3; Wippel (2000), 322–26.
40 In Phys. I, lect. 15 (§ 135). “[A]ll created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the 
first and universal principle of all being” (ST I, 4, 3, co.). See also SCG III, 19, no. 4.
41 Quod. 8, 2.
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degrees of imitation (greater or lesser), as none of the finite creatures can 
imitate the fullness of God’s essence.42
3.4. Divine Action and Efficient Cause
With regard to God as the first source of forms, Thomas reminds us that the 
likeness between the agent, i.e., the efficient cause, and its effect observed 
in nature, makes it unreasonable to pass over the natural generators of 
substantial forms and to claim that God obviates the causality of natural 
agents. Referring once more to divine exemplars we can say they “concre-
ate” form and matter, while natural agents “generate” things by causing 
forms to be educed from the potentiality of primary matter.
Consequently, Thomas states that natural agents are the cause of the 
coming-to-be (causa fiendi) of a thing, while they cannot be the ultimate 
cause of its being (causa essendi).43 But the question still remains with 
regard to the nature of the efficient causation of creatures in the coming-
to-be of inanimate and animate entities. Does it interfere or concur with 
God’s action? In the previous sections we have seen God as the source 
of being, primary matter, and intrinsic substantial forms. We have also 
discussed the causation of divine exemplars, which Thomas defines as 
extrinsic forms, i.e., divine ideas in the mind of God. The time has come 
to ask whether God acts through the efficient causation of natural agents 
as well, and if he does so, how we can explain the apparent problem of the 
double agency of God and creatures in causing the same effect.
3.4.1. Primary and Secondary Causation
Aquinas sees God as the first source of all efficient causation. He states, “all 
agents act in virtue of God himself: and therefore He is the cause of action 
42 In his detailed study of divine exemplarism in Aquinas, Doolan (2008) notes that although 
the doctrine posits forms apart from matter, it does not contradict the Aristotelian posi-
tion. In reference to Q. de ver. 3, 1, ad 4, he reminds us that “natural forms cannot exist 
immaterially of themselves, but they can acquire an immateriality from the one in whom 
they exist. This is evident with our own intellects in which they exist in an immaterial 
way, and so such forms can also exist in an immaterial way in the divine intellect” (Doolan 
2008, 82).
43 See In I Sent. 7, 1, 1, ad 3; Q. de ver. 5, 8, ad 8; Q. de pot. 5, 1; ST I, 104, 1.
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in every creature.”44 At the same time, he introduces important metaphysi-
cal distinctions which help him specify the nature of divine efficient action 
in relation to the efficient causality of creatures. Thomas distinguishes 
first between God as the “primary cause,” and creatures as “secondary 
causes,” emphasizing that “God’s immediate provision over everything 
does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors 
of His order.”45 Since God as the Creator has gifted every creature with its 
proper causality, according to its nature, his influence cannot interfere 
with this causality, but must rather be its source. Consequently, while we 
can say that through the combined agencies of God and the natural agent 
a particular natural effect comes to be, we must remember
that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in 
such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather, 
it is wholly done by both, according to a different way, just as the same effect 
is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent.46
This is possible once we acknowledge that, metaphysically speaking, the 
transcendent God does not belong to the same order of causes as creatures. 
Even if “all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first 
and universal principle of all being”47 that is immanently present in their 
operations, the causation of the Creator transcends that of the creatures 
infinitely. The influence of the first cause is therefore not only more in-
tense, so that we can state with Aquinas that “God is more especially the 
cause of every action than are the secondary agent causes.”48 We must also 
realize that God’s agency belongs, in its essence, to an entirely different 
44 ST I, 105, 5, co.
45 ST I, 22, 3, ad 2. See also ST I, 19, 6, ad 3; 19, 8, co.; 23, 5, co.; 105, 5, ad 2; I–II, 10, 4, ad 2; 
Doolan (2004), 407; Gilson (1956), 176, 182-84; Te Velde (1995), 170–75.
46 SCG III, 70, no. 8. “[J]ust as it is not unfitting for one action to be produced by an agent and 
its power, so it is not inappropriate for the same effect to be produced by a lower agent and 
God: by both immediately, though in different ways” (SCG III, 70, no. 5). See also Doolan 
(2004), 408–409.
47 ST I, 4, 3, co.
48 SCG III, 67, no. 5. See also ST I, 21, 4, co.; 36, 3, ad 4; Q. de ver. 5, 9, ad 10; Q. de pot. 3, 7, co.
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ontological order, which makes it transcend infinitely the causation of 
creatures.
3.4.2. Principal and Instrumental Causation
The passage from Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles quoted above, in which 
he attributes causal effects observed in nature to the agency of both God 
and creatures, introduces a further distinction in the realm of secondary 
causes, which remains crucial for Thomas’ theory of efficient causation. 
While some secondary causes act according to their natural dispositions, 
others produce effects beyond their capacities. Aquinas classifies the latter 
as instrumental causes and emphasizes their dependence on principal 
causes for their operation. To give an example, a flute played by the flautist 
produces an effect that exceeds its capacity. Hence, it is an instrumental 
cause of the sound, which depends on the principal agency of the flautist. 
However, when we consider the same flautist playing her flute in an or-
chestra, we realize that her action does not exceed her capacities. To the 
contrary, it is proportionate to her skills. But at the same time, guided 
by the gesture of the conductor, she contributes to a greater effect of the 
sound of the symphony. The flautist can be thus classified as the secondary 
cause of the symphony, and contributes to it only under the influence of 
the primary cause (a conductor).
Aquinas applies the distinction between principal and instrumental 
causation in his theology of divine action. Dodds notes this is a fact of great 
importance. Since all actions of efficient causality involve a bestowal of 
being, whether substantially or accidentally, distinguishing between prin-
cipal and instrumental causes, we describe God as the source of absolute 
being, bringing the world into existence ex nihilo in the act of the initial 
creation, and keeping it in being afterward. At the same time, we ascribe to 
creatures an instrumental causality in the instantiation of new particular 
beings, through substantial or accidental change.49
Consequently, we can further specify and nuance Aquinas’ statement 
that natural agents cannot be the ultimate cause of being of a thing (causa 
49 See Dodds (2012), 193–94.
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essendi). I want to argue, together with Wippel, that, although Thomas 
insists that creatures cannot produce the act of being (esse) ex nihilo, it 
is nevertheless possible to hold that they can be—in a sense—causes of 
esse. Since being is always given by God in proportion to form educed 
from primary matter, if the latter happens through the operation of the 
instrumental causation of secondary causes, we can state that they are—
analogously speaking—instrumental causes of esse. Hence, we find Aquinas 
saying: “[B]eing is the proper product of the primary agent, that is, of God; 
and all things that give being do so because they act by God’s power.”50 In 
other words, they do so as instrumental causes acting under the principal 
causation of God.
To sum up, we can see that the two metaphysical distinctions offered by 
Aquinas enable him to argue in favor of divine concurrentism, attributing 
the source of efficient causation fully both to God and natural agents. 
His reasoning avoids the charge of overdetermination, as it is based on 
the ontological distinction between the causation of God and that of his 
creatures.
3.5. Divine Action and Final Cause
The last of the four causes, which both Aristotle and Aquinas regard as the 
“cause of causes,” is the final cause. According to Aquinas, similar to other 
modes of causation, all forms of natural teleology find their ultimate source 
in God. He notes that “the end of all things is some extrinsic good,” which 
50 SCG III, 66, no. 4. See also SCG III, 67, no. 1; II, 21; III. 66, nos. 1-3; no. 5; Q. de pot. 3, 7, 
co.; ad 3; ad 16; 5, 1, co.; ST I, 45, 5, co.; 104, 1, co. Wippel (2000, 213) notes that “[F]or 
Thomas, whenever a new substance is efficiently caused by a natural or created agent, 
that agent’s causation applies both to the act of being itself (esse) of the new substance 
and to a particular determination of esse as realized in that substance. Causation of the 
particular determination (this or that kind of form) is owing to the created efficient cause 
insofar as it operates by its own inherent power as a principal cause. Causation of the act 
of being itself (esse) is assigned to it as an instrumental cause acting with the power of 
God and to God himself as the principal cause of the same. From this it follows that one 
should not maintain that Thomas denies that created causes can efficiently cause the 
act of existing or the act of being, at least in the process of bringing new substances into 
being. See also Doolan (2004), 400–408; Gilson (2002), 210–12.
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is “outside [extrinsic to] the universe.”51 It is desired by all creatures as they 
are looking for the fulfillment of their nature. In other words, ἐντελέχεια, 
an ultimate actualization of form in the final state of a being, bears some 
likeness to God and his goodness. It brings Aquinas to the conclusion that 
“everything is […] called good from the divine goodness, as from the first 
exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.”52 Consequently, 
we must acknowledge that:
All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as 
the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being. […] 
And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, 
and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation 
of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have 
a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher 
intelligence.53
All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether 
this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; be-
cause nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the 
likeness to God.54
Most importantly, as Dodds notes, this influence of God as the first final 
cause is much more profound than “the force that moves the atoms in 
Newtonian science.” It does not involve any force, or the physical push-
ing-and-pulling characteristic of efficient causality. It is simply a commu-
nication of the perfection and goodness of God, who does not act to attain 
any fulfillment in his divine action:
51 ST I, 103, 2, co.
52 ST I, 6, 4, co. “God moves as the object of desire and apprehension” (ST I, 105, 2, ad 2). See 
also In I Sent. 34, 1, 2, co.; ST I, 6, 1, co.; ad 2; I–II, 109, 6, co.
53 ST I, 6, 1, ad 2.
54 ST I, 44, 4, ad 3. “Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three 
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or ap-
parent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates 
in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause 
of every operation as its end” (ST I, 105, 5, co.). See also Gilson (1940), 75; Barnes (2014), 
349–61.
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Some things … are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect 
agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition 
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, 
to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His 
perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its 
own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. 
Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.55
This remark concludes our short study of Aquinas’ understanding of divine 
action in reference to the fourfold division of causes. At the same time, the 
enquiry pursued so far encourages an analysis of theological implications 
of EM and DC, redefined in terms of the same theory of causation. Such 
analysis is the object of the remaining section of this article.
4. Emergentism and Divine Action
If it is true that God is the first and ultimate source of being, the Creator 
of primary matter, the source of all forms (forma formarum), the first and 
principal efficient cause, working through secondary and instrumental 
causation of his creatures, the source of all teleology and the end of all 
things, then the new emergent levels of complexity, observable in nature 
and redefined in terms of the fourfold notion of causation, must be an 
expression of divine action. In other words, since the coherence and 
plausibility of the irreducible character of EM and DA can be proved and 
defended with reference to the retrieved classical division of four causes, 
the dialogue between natural sciences and philosophy can be further 
extended to include the theological perspective of divine action in and 
through emergent entities/organisms and dynamical processes.
I claim, together with Aquinas, that God communicates his goodness 
and perfection through all four types of causation, at all levels of complex-
ity. The theory of EM and DC highlights some particular stages of one and 
the same process that is an expression of the abundance of God’s actuality, 
which he wants to share with and bestow upon his creation.
55 ST I, 44, 4, co. See also ST I, 25, 2, co.; Dodds (2012), 181–82.
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Although God does this through the secondary causation of natural 
agents, what he communicates is his very being. Our reflection on divine 
action in reference to all four modes of causation helps us realize that even 
if substantial forms are educed from the potentiality of primary matter 
through the efficient causation of secondary causes, their actuality is ulti-
mately rooted in the pure actuality of God. Similarly, the act of being (esse) 
of concrete nonliving entities and organisms, even if caused instrumentally 
by creatures, is never produced by them ex nihilo, but is ultimately rooted 
in the actuality of God, whose esse is identical with his essentia.
Moreover, as we consider divine exemplars of all emergent entities, we 
arrive at the same conclusion. Even if these ideas in the mind of God are 
multiplied according to their relations to things, according to their reality 
they are nothing other than the divine essence, inasmuch as its likeness 
can be shared in many different ways by different things. Thus, even if 
among created things some can be called exemplars of others because of 
their likeness to those other things (according to the same species or to 
the analogy of some kind of imitation), their exemplarism has its source in 
divine essence as well.56
Regarding the theological interpretation of new kinds of teleology 
proper for emergents, we have seen natural finality as the communication 
of the ultimate perfection and goodness of God as well. For whatever per-
fection is achieved as the fulfillment of a rational or an irrational creature’s 
nature (i.e., in its ἐντελέχεια—an ultimate actualization of its form), it bears 
similarity to the ultimate perfection of God’s being, which is “desired” 
by all creatures. Thus, we agree with Aquinas, repeating once again his 
important conclusion, which states, “Everything is … called good from the 
56 See Doolan (2008), 19, 102–103. Doolan holds that, for Aquinas, divine exemplarism plays 
an integral role in the theory of participation. In reference to the twofold divine exem-
plarism, he notes that a finite being participates in divine nature according to its many 
perfections inasmuch as it has being, life, goodness, and the like. By contrast, a finite 
being participates in only one divine exemplar, as it has a particular mode of being, i.e., 
a determinate nature. The latter does not go without qualification, since divine ideas—
sensu stricto—are not themselves participated but “are rather the ‘participabilities’ of the 
likeness of the divine nature as it is known by God, that is, they are his knowledge of the 
ways in which the likeness of his essence can be participated” (ibid., 249).
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divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle 
of all goodness” (ST I, 6, 4, co.).
Conclusion
The goal of the research presented here was to show how the Aristote-
lian-Thomistic theory of causation and divine action can be applied to the 
philosophical and theological reflection inspired by the biology of complex 
(irreducible) structures and dynamic phenomena in nature. The importance 
of this project lies in its actual realization of the preliminary and general 
suggestion of Emmeche et al., Silberstein, and Moreno and Umerez, to rede-
fine EM and DC in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation.57 In 
addition, I have further developed the conversation to include theological 
implications of emergentism, analyzed in referenced to Aquinas’ under-
standing of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes. 
I leave it up to the reader to decide whether my project is successful.
One of the most oft cited statements of Aquinas, in which he claims 
that “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it,” was formulated in the 
context of his affirming the power of human reason, which is indispensable 
in theology, “not, indeed, to prove faith, […] but to make clear other things 
that are put forward in this doctrine” (ST I, 1, 8, ad 2). It is the power of hu-
man reason that enables us to penetrate and understand the world we live 
in. And because the reality of entities, phenomena, and processes taking 
place in this world is quite complex, our intellect is capable of pursuing its 
reflection on different levels of inquiry, which we usually classify under 
domains of natural science, philosophy, and theology. Although distinct 
in their methodology and objective aims, these three areas of human 
knowledge should not remain detached from or hostile toward one another. 
I hope that research presented in this article succeeds in bringing all three 
of them into creative and fruitful dialogue.
57 Aristotelian thought has its recent revival in analytic philosophy as the metaphysics of 
dispositions and their manifestations, with its corresponding view of causation. It is an 
intriguing proposition developed in the context of contemporary science and philosophy 
of science. Its analysis is a subject for a separate study.
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